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Abstract 
In the bombing of urban settlements, the main impacts have been on resident 
civilians, living space and non-military functions. This is shown in the bombing of 
London, Berlin and Tokyo in the Second World War, arguably the first and only 
serious tests of strategic air power and urbicide to determine war outcomes. The 
history and scope of raiding of these capital cities differed in many ways, but the 
civilian experience and urban implications were very similar. The bombings 
attacked the most vulnerable areas, where resident populations found themselves 
poorly protected at best. The intentions, as well as results, of the raiding are 
examples of urbicide, planned to kill indiscriminately and destroy all elements of 
urban existence. Yet, a disarticulation emerges between the political, industrial and 
war-controlling functions of the capitals, which the bombing was supposed to 
disable but could not, and the plight of their citizens. The bombing was encouraged 
as ‘spectacular violence’, even though militarily inconclusive and, in seeking to 
avoid combat while terrorising non-combatants, it experimented with an approach 
to armed violence that would prevail after 1945. Despite enormous changes since 
1945, the plight of bombed civilians has changed little. 
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Introduction 
No state can do without a capital city to serve as the pivot of its 
culture...No great nation can long endure without a centre where its 
political, intellectual and economic life can be focused, and its people 
feel united.  
  Heinrich von Trietsche (quoted in Willis, 1973, 791) 
...the total devastation of the centre of a vast city such as Berlin would 
offer incontrovertible proof to all peoples of the power of a modern 
bomber force...a long continuing memorial to the effects which 
strategical [sic!] bombing had produced in this war and could produce 
at any time again. 
    Directorate of Bomber Operations, U.K. (1944), PRO AIR 20/4831.  
Shortly after the first aircraft flew a century ago,  air forces were deployed to 
bomb cities. Civilian air raid casualties since then have numbered in the millions. 
Tens of millions have been made homeless, displaced and otherwise directly 
affected by aerial bombardment (Iklé, 1958; Hewitt, 1997). More civilians have 
been killed by other forms of armed violence, but counter-city bombing emerged as 
the largest threat of destruction for cities, whether compared to other forms of 
warfare or to natural and technological disasters (Elliot, 1972; Hewitt, 1983; 
Rummel, 1994). Air power, especially as it threatens cities, epitomizes total war 
and the so-called balance of (nuclear) terror. It has been the focus of ‘civil defense’ 
and is a leading instrument of the ‘war on terror’ (Quester, 1966; Ali, 2000).  
My focus is on civilians in heavily bombed cities, the consequences of the 
destruction of communities and their living space, urban services and cultural 
heritage. I look mainly at evidence of whom, what, and where of raid impacts and 
civilian responses; a viewpoint from under the bombs, giving priority to the 
condition of city-dwellers. This ‘view from below’ contrasts with the commanding 
perspectives of air power (Virilio and Der Derian, 1997). The attacks appear much 
more like calamities than warfare. They are about terror, not fighting (Graham, 
2004). However, it may be wondered what can be learned from attacks 60+ years 
ago and, something not seen since, attacks on the capital cities of major powers.  
Wars since 1945 appear very different from the Second World War, and there 
have been extraordinary innovations in air weapons systems. Recent investigations 
of these issues highlight new or emerging urban features and the unique contexts of 
recent wars. There are transformations in architecture, telecommunications, 
surveillance, counter-insurgency and urban warfare. The talk is of “cybercities”, 
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“homeland security”, terrorism and urban geopolitics (Davis, 1998; Graham, 2004). 
These concepts address important arenas of contemporary life and compelling 
concerns in urban violence. However, they foreground technocratic and strategic 
transformations, whether to approve or critique them, especially the roles of those 
literally and metaphorically “calling the shots” in cities or at them. 
Conversely, the question addressed here is whether any, or much, of these 
developments alter the predicament of civilians under the bombs. Rather than 
entering some post-modern catastrophic society, badly bombed areas undergo a 
sudden devolution, an extreme projection of Graham’s (2004) “forced 
demodernisation”. As he emphasises, consumer goods and high-tech options are 
less relevant than denial of elementary forms of everyday survival and communion. 
A more accurate if appalling picture may be that conveyed by airmen who have 
wanted to bomb enemies “back into the Stone Age”, notably General Curtis LeMay 
on various occasions (Coffey, 1987). The link with the moral implications and 
experimental nature of the raids, discussed below, is expressed in one of the first 
and most forthright critiques of the bombing war, “Advance to Barbarism” by 
F.J.P. Veale (1962). A main and immediate impact is the loss of homes, another 
atrocity identified as “domicide” by Porteous and Smith (2001). It will be shown 
that domestic space is almost always ‘ground zero’ in the bombing of settlements. 
Equally common are malnutrition, destruction of systems of health care, absent 
hygiene, unsafe consumables and medicines; widespread scavenging, having to eat 
vermin, trafficking and Black Market economies (Gregory, 2004). Meanwhile, 
city-dwellers tend to lack the experience, tools and skills, or permission to pursue 
‘Stone Age’ adaptations. In such terms, the urban wastelands and bombed-out 
people of east London in 1941, the rubble of working class Berlin in 1943, and 
‘dead city’ of downtown Tokyo in 1945, prefigure the essential plight of residents 
in Sarajevo, Beirut and Grozny in the 1990s; Baghdad, urban Gaza, Jalalabad, 
Tskhinvali and Gori today. 
The case for these statements must emerge from world war evidence and 
events. However, it involves an important issue of researching the topic. In recent 
and on-going conflicts, raid plans and results tend to be kept secret. Evidence is 
unreliable and subject to “spin” by interested parties. The same occurred, indeed 
was pioneered, during the world war; but afterwards, the release of once-secret 
documents has offered detailed and relatively clear evidence of the goals and 
impacts of the raids. The bombing threat led governments to watch their own 
citizens very closely. House-by-house and street-by-street investigations were 
made after most attacks; deaths and injuries were diligently recorded. An 
unparalleled record of conditions in the cities survives, including the plight of 
ordinary civilian victims in areas that bore the brunt of the attacks. These records 
have received much less attention than the air war itself, and mainly in studies of 
individual countries or cities (Harrisson, 1976; Havens, 1978; Friedrich, 2002). The 
article makes use of some very rich archival sources: 
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(i)  The United States Strategic Bombing Survey (USSBS) 
collections in the National Archives in Washington D.C. (MacIsaac, 
1976), identified as UBSE (European Surveys) and UBSP (Pacific War 
surveys); and 
(ii)  U.K. Home Office (HO) files relating to wartime conditions 
and Air Ministry (AIR) files on Britain’s prosecution of the bombing 
war, in the Public Record Office (PRO), Kew, London. 
Documents from these sources are essential to the critical approach adopted here. 
They were not compiled with the concerns being addressed but provide strong 
support for them. Evidence gathered and confirmed at the time, and how it was 
used to pursue war aims, is more fundamental to the argument for urbicide than 
later assessments, even if the latter are more accurate. Equally important, items 
cited differ markedly from official, wartime pronouncements and most of  the air 
war literature since. They come from the most neglected parts of the same archives, 
but provide detailed records of the extent and nature of civilian casualties, de-
housing, etc. They show that these were not just clearly known to raid analysts, but 
were central to raid objectives. As such they provide firmer support of existing 
critiques of the bombing based largely on inference (Veale, 1962), or second-hand 
sources and post-war observations in the cities (Lindqvist, 2000; Grayling, 2006).  
The Morality of ‘morale bombing’ 
An urban, civil perspective cannot ignore ethical and legal implications; civil 
society is impossible without them. Broadly, I agree with positions defined by 
others who specialise in humanitarian law and “the laws of war”, that the urban 
raids violated fundamental principles (Walzer, 1977; Grayling, 2006; Selden, 
2008). Even so, the evidence suggests most civilians in bombed cities were neither 
pacifists nor anti-military, and backed their own air force. Few thought air war, 
even the enemy pilots bombing their city, inherently wrong – only the bombing of 
defenceless, uninfluential civilians (Hewitt, 1994a). Therefore, it seems 
inappropriate to assume an anti-war or anti-air force approach here, whatever the 
merits of such positions. 
Recently, counter-city attacks have been called “urbicide”, a word coined by 
Bosnian architects during the conflicts in the former Yugoslavia (Graham, 2004; 
Coward, 2004, 165). The term is at least less ugly than the phenomenon it defines, 
and situates attacks on cities among other forms of indiscriminate and 
reprehensible violence, including genocide (Shaw, 2004; Valentino, 2004). There is 
not just destruction; each death and loss contributes to, and is usually intended to 
cause, extermination of the larger social body—in this case, the people, support 
systems and associations upon which urban/civil life depend. It contravenes the 
basic intent, often the letter, of conventions to outlaw attacks on non-combatants.  
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The raiding of capital cities emerges as the intentional annihilation of primate 
cities, resulting in massive civilian casualties; a process also called “morale 
bombing” and, by its victims, “terror bombing”. This is not to say that what 
civilians endured in other cities was less severe, or can be treated as somehow less 
important. If anything, a stronger conclusion is that civilians in all heavily bombed 
cities shared similar predicaments. Equally, post-1945 bombings of cities are not 
less, but also not more, painful and urbicidal. They may be very different in 
intensity, scale or context. However, world war raid plans did view the capitals as 
exemplary, “show cases” in a set of aims, experiments, and consequences definitive 
of urbicide (Lindqvist, 2000, 82; Ali, 2000; Herold, 2004). 
Experiments and Spectacular Violence 
Two other features of the capitals’ story would assume general significance 
for urbicide in the post-war world: the practice of “live experiments”, and a related 
preoccupation with demonstration pieces or spectacle. Each identifies a mind-set—
military and social assumptions—that continue today. Of course, experimental sites 
and models are integral to air war planning. Incendiaries were tested on mock-ups 
of “German vernacular architecture” and Japanese urban areas (Standard Oil 
Development Co., 1943; Bond, 1946).2 However, the story of the capitals 
underscores an experimental element in actual raids. New techniques were 
continually being tried out to increase surprise and destructiveness. The A-bomb 
victims saw themselves as “guinea pigs”, and are unique in this respect (Lifton, 
1967). Nevertheless, conducting live experiments against urban areas applies to the 
earliest “blitzes” on British cities, to the V-rocket attacks, RAF “main force” fire 
raids on German cities, and USAAF fire raids on Japanese cities.  
In air war planning and table talk another preoccupation emerges: making a 
statement, teaching lessons to the enemy or, as the quotation above suggests, to “all 
peoples”. Documents would refer to a raid as a “big show”. The most destructive 
raids, those on the capitals especially, were freighted with notions of exemplary 
spectacle.  
The ‘society of spectacle’ was an interpretation of modernity developed by a 
radical, primarily urban, political movement in the 1960s: the Situationists 
(McDonough, 2002). It characterises modern, urban-industrial society as governed 
through “... an ever-growing mass of image-objects ... [by which] the ruling order 
discourses endlessly upon itself in an uninterrupted monologue of self-praise ...” 
Such a “monologue” had appeared in bombing wars long before and served the 
same “... abstracted vantage-point of the master-subject ...” (Debord, 1994, 17 and 
19). However, the bombers’ spectacles were intended to shape the imagination of 
                                                 
2
AIR 14/763 (Saundby) 19 Jan, 1942; Bottomley, 25 Oct, 41; AIR 52/77; HO 191/194 Research and 
Experiments Dept., “Japanese Domestic Architecture” (12 Mar. 1944). 
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destruction rather than “production”. They sought to communicate spectacles of 
death and ruin, rather than of consumption and commodities, to so-called mass 
society. The same is found more recently in “shock and awe”, while the release of 
“smart” bombing footage contributes to this sense of dazzling spectacle. It also 
continues another enduring theme of air war rhetoric: that high-tech improvements 
in weaponry reduce or avoid the supposedly accidental “collateral damage” of 
earlier raids. In the Second World War, it was already claimed that the latest 
technologies made bombing efficient, precise, and less indiscriminate. The 
newsreels, newspapers and war speeches made it seem even more accurate than 
today’s smart bombs. As will be seen, it was monstrously inaccurate and 
indiscriminate. Meanwhile, today’s smarter weapons kill even more civilians per 
ton than those of the world wars, ensuring that civilians remain the majority of 
victims (Herold, 2004; Gregory, 2004). 
Capital Punishment 
Capital cities have had a special relation to the expectations and conduct of 
strategic air war. Visions of a capital falling in fire and ruin beneath an enemy air 
fleet appeared long before any air force existed (Clarke, 1992). Capitals have been 
bombed in most wars involving air power, from the small Italian effort over 
Tripoli, Libya, in 1911 to the massive assaults on Baghdad in 1991 and 2003, and 
on Belgrade and Grozny in 1999 (Lindqvist, 2001). Only two factors seem to 
restrain states: lack of an air force or of aircraft capable of reaching the enemy 
capital.  
Planning documents from the First and Second World Wars show the 
destruction of the enemy’s capital city as a primary goal: to demonstrate the unique 
strategic ability to leap over the battlefronts and assail the “nerve centre” of the 
enemy. In the First World War there were raids on London and Paris. Some 
neighbourhoods suffered appalling civilian casualties, but the raids were deemed 
militarily ineffective. However, new technologies and larger bomber fleets were 
expected to change that (Warner, 1943; MacIsaac, 1986). Between the world wars, 
Londoners received many dire warnings. J.F.C. Fuller (1923, 15) foresaw a fleet of 
aircraft reducing the capital “to pandemonium” in half an hour, the government 
swept away “in an avalanche of terror.” Liddell Hart (1925, 47), another respected 
military theorist, foresaw the collapse of “organisation and central direction” and 
“anarchy” as crowds of “maddened ... marauding ... slum dwellers” roamed the 
city.  
The attacks were rationalised in terms of the concentration of political and 
material power. In the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, Old World capitals 
generally grew faster than most other cities, inflated by relatively recent 
concentrations of political and financial power, by industrialisation and 
transportation networks focussed on them. This helps explain how Berlin, after the 
unification of Germany (1871), and Tokyo after the Restoration (1868), developed 
Proving Grounds of Urbicide 346 
so quickly into cities unrivalled in their own countries and rivalling older capitals 
abroad. The world wars came at the climax of this metropolitan dominance within 
an international system shaped by the Old World imperial powers. 
In 1939, dominance appeared in the entire profile of demographic, economic 
and political power. Greater London, with more than 8 million inhabitants, was the 
most populous city in Europe, perhaps the world. Tokyo itself was smaller, but its 
conurbation made it London’s equal. Berlin’s population was about 4.4 million, the 
largest city in Germany and principal metropole of Central Europe. Each capital 
was its nation’s leading industrial city, distinguished by diversity and some of the 
most modern industries. London was the largest port of the empire. Tokyo’s deep 
water port, Yokohama, handled a quarter of all overseas trade. The capitals were 
the foci of national road and railway networks, air traffic, and the mass media. Yet, 
it was mainly bureaucratic centralism and control of communications that 
underwrote their ability to shape national destinies. Concerted action of 
governments and corporations helped the global influence of metropolitan elites.  
There proved to be much illusion about the role of capitals in war, or what 
the bombers might do about that. However, a capital seemed to involve great 
vulnerability too and, as the second quotation above indicates, a compelling target 
for the air arm. Capitals also attracted apocalyptic visions of the collapse of 
civilisation and “city-hating”: the backlash of paranoia and disaffection, equally 
part of the era of rapid urban growth and centralisation. They found fertile ground 
in the mindset of those gearing up to attack the capitals with weapons of mass 
devastation.  
Towards Urban Apocalypse 
In the Second World War aircraft attacked at least twenty-nine capitals 
throughout the Old World. In Britain, Germany and Japan the capitals suffered the 
heaviest weight of attack and extent of destruction (Table 1). London and Tokyo 
had their respective country’s greatest civilian casualties. Some other towns 
suffered greater proportionate losses: Hamburg and, possibly, Dresden had more 
civilian casualties than Berlin. There is a huge literature on the raiding of London 
and Berlin—Tokyo to a smaller extent in English—but little has been written 
comparing their stories, least of all the civilian experience (cf. Robert, 1997). 
The bomb load directed at Berlin was twice that for the other two capitals 
combined, but its casualties were not proportionately larger. Despite fewer raids 
and a much smaller weight of bombs, Tokyo had by far the greatest devastation and 
civilian deaths.  
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Table 1. Comparative summary of the scale and impact of air attacks on 
London, Berlin, and Tokyo  
Impact data London Berlin Tokyo 
All 360 241 89 
Large (>50 aircraft) 71 73 25 
Raids 
Other data 2937 V-weapon   
All (short tons) 30,000 75,350 16,568 
% incendiaries 10 42 89 
Bomb 
Weight 
Urban area raids (%) ? 48 68 
Total 29,890 
 
50,000 (?) 100,000+ 
Severe 50,507 33,230 c.1 million 
Civilians 
Killed 
and 
Injured3 Light 88,848 ? In all 
Building 
Destruction 
0.4 million 1.7 million 2.9 million 
Demolished+ Severe 50,000+ 125, 775 
 
267,171 
Civilians 
Bombed 
Out 
Homes Lost ? 500,765 ? 
Urban Area Razed 5 km2 26 km2 70 km2 
Sources: For London: Titmuss, 1950; OBrien, 1955; Wakefield, 1990; for Berlin: USSBS E, 1945a, 
1945c; Hohn, 1991; for Tokyo USSBS P, 1947a and b; Craven and Cate, 1951-53; Edoin, 1987; 
Selden, 2007. 
London: The First Generation of Ruins. 
The “Air Raid Defence League”, which disseminated official views to the 
public in the 1930s, portrayed London as the logical target of a “lightning blow” 
from Germany (A.R.D.L., 1939, 17). A 1936 planning document concluded that 
“London is ... of far greater national importance than Berlin ...” (Webster and 
Frankland, 1961 iv, appendix 8). In the event, Germany showed no interest in a 
lightning blow. More than a year passed before attacks on the capital began and it 
became the foremost target. Nevertheless, half of Britain’s civilian air raid 
casualties occurred within Greater London, and 92 percent of rocket or V-weapon 
deaths; almost 30,000 killed (Calder, 1969; Hewitt, 1990). The larger fraction of 
property destruction occurred there, especially housing. 
Londoners’ experience is singled out by concentrated damage and casualties 
in the “Big Blitz”, the first major urban assault (Wakefield, 1990). Elizabeth 
Bowen (1949) referred to it, ominously enough, as “the first generation of ruins.” It 
began with two attacks on 7th September, 1940, dropping more bombs than fell on 
                                                 
3 See text for ranges and uncertainties 
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the whole country in the First World War. Some 840 Londoners were killed and 
2,350 seriously injured.4 If the pre-war apocalyptic visions were not realised, that 
was not obvious in the worst-hit parts. From the docklands and East End boroughs 
fear spread across the whole metropolis: 
... The first night ... As we came over Westminster Bridge ... the whole 
of the left side of London seemed to be alight ... [with] the whole fury 
of that conflagration ...Civilians hastened by in twos and threes, hushed 
below the stupendous pall of defeat ... (Green, 1943, 176-7). 
Henry Green, novelist and volunteer fireman, was not alone in reporting 
inexperienced, confused fire-fighting and rescue work. Decades of official 
warnings, exhortations to civilians, were nowhere matched by well-planned 
readiness. For several days the raiders suffered little interference from aerial 
defences. Shelters and assistance to raid victims were quite inadequate. Most of the 
bombed-out had to fend for themselves (Titmuss, 1950; O’Brien, 1955).  
Virginia Woolf‘s (1988) diary records “the burning houses”, the fear and 
wreckage. She tried “... to imagine how one's killed by a bomb ...” – as well she 
might! It was 2nd October and some 7,000 civilians had died around her in barely 
three weeks. And women formed over half the casualties, although mostly from 
poorer East End districts.5 A rich sense of what ordinary civilians had to say of 
their experience is found in Harrisson (1976), Hostettler (1990), and Wakefield 
(1990). Voices from the capitals are included in an “oral geography” of air war 
developed by Hewitt (1994a). 
Some dignify this phase as “The Battle of London.” If so, it was a battle “... 
of the unknown warriors ... men, women and children ... in the towns and streets 
...” (Churchill, 2003, 233). They wielded fire buckets and spades, not guns; 
struggled to save their families and neighbourhoods rather than a battlefront; fought 
against explosion, fire, lack of sleep, not their attackers. In ten weeks nearly 13,000 
were killed, 18,000 seriously injured, and over 300,000 bombed out. The raiding 
then shifted to provincial cities but there were few weeks without some raiders over 
the capital. London’s worst individual raids came in the spring of 1941. 
The German Air Force did not mount another assault as severe as the Big 
Blitz, and probably could not have. In hindsight, the war starts to go against 
Germany after 1942; an Allied victory was in the cards from 1943. For ordinary 
Londoners, however, none of this was obvious. Germany remained the dominant 
military power in Europe for three more years. Its airmen seemed able, more or less 
at will, to choose a target for raiding. In 1943, raids killed 542 Londoners and 
                                                 
4 HO 198/245. 
5 HO 192/245 for East End casualties 
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hospitalised 989. Five sharp attacks in February 1944 killed 600 and seriously 
injured 1,300 (Calder, 1969).  
Only the D-Day landings of June 1944 seemed really to turn the tide; but at 
that moment the V-Weapon assaults began (Collier, 1957). London was again a 
proving ground for a new form of urbicide. Some 2,420 “Flying Bombs” and 517 
V-2 rockets fell within the metropolitan region, almost half of all that landed on 
British soil. Roughly ten times more deaths per strike occurred within London than 
elsewhere. Such random, automatic warfare, going on day and night against the 
civilian population, was uniquely stressful and surreal (Pynchon, 1973). 
Berlin: “Reichstrümmerstadt” (Rubble Capital). 
Berlin was spared air attacks in the First World War. Early in the Second it 
remained near the limit of Britain’s Royal Air Force (RAF) operations and was 
ranked behind the Ruhr as a target of economic warfare. Later on, however, it 
became the focus of attacks intended to be decisive. City authorities reported 378 
air attacks (Table 2). Civilian casualties occurred in 185 of these raids (Hampe and 
Beeskow, 1978; Hampe and Mauter, 1982; Demps, 1982). Almost 75,000 tons of 
bombs were directed at Berlin, an enormous commitment, although less than a 
third actually fell there. The weight carried partly reflects efforts to overcome poor 
results with ever-greater saturation and repetition.  
Destructive RAF night raids began on 25th-26th August 1940, but for three 
years were “ ... of a harassing nature, the object being to maintain fear of attack 
over the city and to impose ARP [Air Raid Protection] measures ...” (Webster and 
Frankland 1961, 144).6 Notice here a common and extraordinary assumption of this 
style of offensive, urbicidal warfare. Somehow, air planners thought that forcing 
the enemy to deploy forces in defence of its own cities was a bonus; defending 
even its greatest ‘nerve centre’ a waste of resources, rather than using the aircraft 
and artillery in distant battlegrounds—no mention being made of the, usually far 
greater, cost of the attacking force. The matter may seem different since 1945, 
when most air raids have been against cities and countries lacking any aerial 
defences. 
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Table 2. Six monthly totals of raids, civilian casualties and bombed out for 
Berlin 
Dates Raids Civilians 
Year Months Total Large, 
urban 
(USAAF) 
Killed* Bombed 
out 
Jan – June - - - - 1940 
 July – Dec. 33 1 222 9,867 
Jan. –June 7 - 97 5,244 1941 
July - Dec. 10 2 101 4 ,729 
Jan – June - - - - 1942 
July – Dec. 2 - 2 - 
Jan – June 9 5 1,169 88,189 1943 
July – Dec. 19 10 6,700 659,428 
Jan – June 31 18 + (2) 4,108 469,168 1944 
July – Dec. 44 40 + (4) 1,191 66,054 
1945 
 
Jan – June 75 56 + (4) 4,429 385,074 
TOTALS  241 203 + (15) 18,019 1,687.753 
* Based on the only detailed record in Hampe and Beeskow (1978), but their numbers are too low 
(see text) 
Sources: RAF Raids based on Middlebrook and Everitt (1985) and USAAF on USSBS E (1945a) 
Not until 1943 could a major offensive be mounted against Berlin. 
Thereafter, it suffered a catastrophic demolition. Some reports cite 80,000 Berliners 
killed by hostile action. A former chief of German fire services mentions “... at 
least 52,000 dead and twice as many severely injured” (Rumpf, 1962, 159-60). The 
head of the Civil Defence Police estimated 49,600 (quoted in Hohn 1991, 135). 
The only detailed, official register gives 18,019 civilian deaths (Hampe and 
Beeskow, 1978), but it seems much too low.  
Unlike many other German cities, Berlin’s layout restricted the development 
of mass fires. However, a third of the city’s housing was destroyed or badly 
damaged, some 40 percent of the 1939 population bombed out (Hohn, 1991, 134-
5). About 45 percent of public, commercial and industrial buildings were destroyed 
(Bond, 1947, chapters 5 and 6). Those serving the civilian population suffered 
earlier and more heavily than those directly serving the war effort. Countless 
buildings of great historic and architectural interest were destroyed (Beseler and 
Gutschow, 1988, vol 1, 135-199).7 
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  The episode of greatest damage, civilian casualties, and displacement began 
with RAF Bomber Command’s “Battle of Berlin”, from November 1943 through 
March 1944; in effect, Berliners’ “Big Blitz”. Air Marshall Harris assured Mr. 
Churchill: “We can wreck Berlin from end to end if the USAAF will come in on it. 
It will cost between us 400-500 aircraft. It will cost Germany the war”.8 
The commitment was unprecedented, with 32,646 tons of bombs dispatched, 
even if only 18 percent fell on Berlin or did what was classed as “effective” 
damage.9 In some raids the RAF had severe losses and, in all, some 2,500 airmen 
were killed, 1,047 aircraft destroyed and 1,682 damaged (Middlebrook and Everitt, 
1985, 488; Terraine, 1988, 557). German air defences also had great losses 
(Demps, 1982), reminders of how deadly the raiding could be for air crew in this 
war. Partly to deceive the aerial defences, other cities were targeted as part of the 
operations (Middlebrook and Everitt, 1985; Friedrich, 2002). On 30th-31st March 
Bomber Command attacked Nürnberg and ninety-two aircraft were lost, perhaps 
their worst of the war, leading the RAF to halt the offensive.  
The official historians thought the Battle of Berlin a military failure (Webster 
and Frankland, 1961). Nevertheless, it was an unprecedented calamity for the city, 
killing at least 9,000 German civilians and over 600 foreign workers.10 British 
Intelligence reported 30 km2 of the built-up area devastated, ten times more than 
for London. About 1.2 million people were bombed out and 1.5 million evacuated, 
two-thirds of the wartime totals (Hampe and Mauter, 1978).11 
There was resistance to ‘area attacks’ by the US command, and to Harris’ 
proposals for Berlin, which some classed as “terror bombing“ and contrary to 
American policy (Craven and Cate, 1948-1953. v.3, 726-7). Yet, a critical shift 
occurred in 1944 when the Eighth Air Force began large area attacks on some 
cities. Meanwhile, their daylight ‘precision’ raids against Berlin were usually from 
above 8,000m altitude to avoid the “murderous German flak”. They employed 
“blind bombing” through a cloud cover and problems of inaccuracy were countered 
by “... drenching an area with bombs”. Hence, damage was very indiscriminate. In 
1945, US raids on Berlin were extremely destructive, causing a third of the area 
devastation and housing losses, if a small fraction of casualties. So many people 
had already been driven out.  
                                                 
8 AIR 20/842, Minute 3 Nov. 1943  9 AIR 20/842. 
10 AIR 14/838,905; 20/842, 3234. 
11 “Bericht über eine Rundreise durch luftkriegsbetroffene Städte ...im Januar/Februar 1944”,  
Staatsarchiv Hamburg, states 25% of all housing lost. Speer Docs. 21.5% destroyed; British 
Intelligence estimated seriously damaged housing in Berlin at 31%, based on air photographs to 
June 1944. 
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In the end Berlin suffered a dreadful annihilation (Brett-Smith, 1967). A 
member of J.K. Galbraith’s U.S.S.B.S. Berlin team, wrote on 19th July, 1945: 
... The place is uniquely devastated, not so much quantitatively as 
qualitatively. The city is a living corpse - much more than anything I 
saw in the West [of Germany]. The impact of the catastrophe on people 
seems to be larger ... need, starvation, disruption of the most primitive 
processes of life more outspoken ... That Berlin could have functioned 
to any appreciable extent in the last months of the war is almost 
incredible ...12  
 U.S. Secretary of State, Harry Hopkins, called Berlin “a modern Carthage” in 
reference to the Roman annihilation of that ancient city (Irving, 1989, 290). The 
amount of rubble defies belief; some 70 million m3. Eventually, what could not be 
salvaged was dumped in great spoil heaps, which are today the largest ‘hills’ in 
Berlin. A satirical name was coined for what the capital, the “Reichshauptstadt”, 
had become: “Reichstrümmerstadt” or Rubble Capital (Conradt and Heckmann-
Janz, 1987). 
Summary statistics and the final state of London and Berlin can obscure two 
aspects of civilian experience. On the one hand, civilians endured many months 
when there was little or no raiding. There were years of life amid the rubble; not a 
minor inconvenience for domestic survival. Many recalled lack of sleep as their 
worst memories; endless problems with disrupted meals, uncomfortable, unsanitary 
and crowded air raid shelters (USSBS, 1945c; Harrisson, 1976, 100-121). There 
were hundreds of “false alarms” making people apathetic about raid dangers, and 
many stopped going to the shelters (Hewitt, 1997, chapter 11). On the other hand, 
destruction and death came, overwhelmingly, in a very few catastrophic attacks. It 
is appropriate to consider them, before turning to Tokyo. 
Disaster Raids  
 In most attacks, damages tended to be highly localised. Early in the London 
Blitz, the physicist J.D. Bernal started an inventory of “disaster incidents.” A 
selection from his lists indicates impacts mainly on ‘ordinary’ civilians in their 
homes, places of entertainment or air raid shelters (Table 3). The V-weapon strikes 
produced many such disaster incidents and some of the worst. A special calamity 
was when hospitals were hit; 76 in London with 2,600 beds lost (Titmuss, 1950; 
O’Brien, 1955). 
                                                 
12  USBS E(A) 39 b 1.9, unpubl. 
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Table 3. Examples of “disaster incidents” recorded in London 
Date Time Place Killed Injured Comment 
1940 
9 Sept.  
   
Night 
 
Cadogan House, 
Chelsea 
  
 61 
  
 - 
 
Raid shelter 
10 Sept.  
 
Night St. Hallsville 
School, 
West Ham  
 73  50 Rest centre 
13 Oct.  Night 157/161 Stoke  
Newington Rd.  
154  33 Public shelter under  
apartment block 
15 Oct. Night Morley College, 
Westminster 
 67  104 Emergency rest and 
feeding centre 
20 Oct. Night St. Peter’s Church  86  107 Shelter in crypt 
1941 
12 Jan 
 
Night 
 
Bank Subway 
Station 
 
111 
 
   6 
 
Used as city shelter 
13 Feb. Night Hendon, houses  75  445 Single 2,500 kg 
bomb 
17 Feb Night Pancras Square  77  52 Single land mine, 
surface shelter 
1943 
20 Jan. 
 
Day 
 
Lewisham, 
Elementary School 
  
59 
  
67 
 
Most were children 
7 Nov. Night Putney 78 210 Dance hall 
1944 
? May 
 
Night 
 
King’s Rd., 
Chelsea 
 
72 
 
111 
 
Apartment block, 40 
missing 
30 June Day The Strand 198  - Shopping area 
3 July Day Turk’s Row, 
Chelsea 
124  - Shopping area 
23 Aug. Day East Barnet 211  - Suburban area 
?  Nov. Day New Cross, 
Woolworth’s  
Store 
160 108 Mostly women and 
children 
1945 
8 Mar. 
 
Day 
 
Finsbury 
 
110 
 
123 
 
Farringdon Market 
Sources: “[J.D.] Bernal’s lists” (PRO/HO 192/7); O’Brien, (1955); Wakefield, (1990). 
The “Battle of London,” a relentless attack night after night, appears as a 
single crisis, but a few individual attacks dominate losses (Table 4). Almost a 
quarter of the Big Blitz death toll came in four night raids. The worst, on 10th-11th 
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May, 1941, killed 1,436 civilians. The most destructive attack, on 29th-30th 
December, 1940, set 1,500 fires .13 Those in the inner City of London around St 
Paul’s Cathedral were fanned by strong winds into uncontrollable mass fires 
(Collier, 1957, 272-3), described as “The Second Great Fire of London” (Johnson, 
1988). And this raid should be seen in relation to a defining moment in the history 
of urbicide—to some, a glorious one (Spaight, 1944). A British Air Staff 
Memorandum of 23rd September, 1941, proposed attacks on German civilian 
morale by targeting the most densely inhabited areas of cities with incendiaries.14 
Huge increases in the scale of attack would follow and ‘successful’ attacks set 
catastrophic fires (Bond, 1946; SIPRI, 1975). This did delay Berlin’s final ruin, the 
capital being less susceptible to incendiary attack.  
 
Table 4. The worst ‘disaster raids’ on London and Berlin 
PLACE 
 Date 
No.  
Aircraft 
Bomb Wt 
Sht. tons. 
(IBs) 
Civilians 
Killed 
Civilians  
Sev. inj. 
Bombed 
Out 
   
COMMENT 
LONDON 
  7-8/9/40 
 
  570 
  
 - (*) 
 
 430 
 
1600 
 
(1,000s) 
 
“Black 
Saturday” 
  8-9/9/40  200  - (*)  412  747   “ ”  
15-16/9/40  410  590 (*)  430   900   
29-
30/12/40 
 136  127 
(22,068) 
 163   569  “2nd Great 
Fire of 
London.” 
Most 
destructive 
raid  
 19-20/3/41  479  470 
(122,292) 
 750  1200  “The 
Wednesday” 
 16-17/4/41  685  890 
(151,230) 
  1180  2230  2,250 fires: 
15 hospital, 
13 churches 
destroyed or 
severely 
damaged 
 19-20/4.41  712 1000 
(153,096) 
 1200 1000  1,460 fires 
                                                 
13 HO 191/86; HO 193/13, 45; HO199/284; 207/45. 
14 AIR 14/763.  
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PLACE 
 Date 
No.  
Aircraft 
Bomb Wt 
Sht. tons. 
(IBs) 
Civilians 
Killed 
Civilians  
Sev. inj. 
Bombed 
Out 
   
COMMENT 
 10-11/5/41  507   711 
(86,173) 
1436 1800  2,154 fires 
BERLIN 
 1-2/3/43 
 
 302 
 
600 (54%) 
 
 709 
 
1825 
 
64,909 
 
 23-24/8/43  727 1570 
(53%) 
 899 2127 103,558  
 3-4/8/43  316  999 
(40%) 
 623 1192  39,844  
 22-
27/11/43 
 1597  5376 
(49%) 
3758 9907 454,056  
16-
17/12/43 
  493  1815 
(48%) 
 628  968  30,063  
27-31/1/44  1741  5188 
(41%) 
1526 2194 172,390  
15-16/2.44  891 2332 
(50%) 
 169  512  60,836  
 21/6/44  876 2843 
(26%) 
 474   756 28,180  
  3/2/45  937 2267 
(11%) 
2541  1688 119,057  
  6/2/45 1112 2886 
(44%) 
 636   389  71,283  
18/3/45 1221 3092 
(50%) 
 336   357  79,785  
Sources: On London O’Brien, 1955; PRO/AIR; Wakefield, 1990; on Berlin USSBS E; Hampe and 
Mauter, 1982; Middlebrook and Everitt, 1985. 
Although raided so often and by large forces, Berlin’s losses were also 
concentrated in a few severe attacks (Table 4). The worst civilian losses occurred in 
the first of three successive raids between 22nd and 27th November, 1943 (Hampe 
and Mauter, 1982). A USAAF attack of 3rd February, 1945, was the most 
destructive of the war. Hans-Georg von Studnitz (1965, 281) described this as “the 
Apocalypse” finally arriving. “Tempelhof [Airfield] and [railway] Marshalling 
Yards” were the designated targets, but it resembled a classic area attack. 15 
In relation to today’s discourses on terror, one notes that no single raid on 
London or Berlin killed as many civilians as the 11th September, 2001, attack on 
New York (“9/11”). There were more casualties in the series of attacks on Berlin 
                                                 
15  USBSE 39 b 1-9. 
Proving Grounds of Urbicide 356 
between 22nd and 27th November, 1943. In Britain, only one attack killed more 
civilians; over 4,000 in Liverpool and Merseyside on 7th-8th April, 1941 (Hewitt, 
1997, 302). For all raids, London and Berlin’s deaths were each ten times greater 
than in New York on 9/11, and there were more civilian injured and dead in a great 
many raids. Meanwhile, at least thirteen single Allied raids on other German cities 
caused more than 3,000 deaths (Hewitt, 1993, 33), and at least ten USAAF raids on 
Japanese cities (Hewitt, 1987). The defining European disaster raids were on the 
thirteen German cities where firestorms were generated (Hewitt, 1993). Dresden is 
the best known, but Hamburg 29th-30th July, 1943, is now recognised as the most 
devastating. Out of over 45,000 deaths, at least 30,000 were women and children 
(Hewitt, 1993, 35).  
None of this is intended to diminish the significance of the avoidable and 
intentional massacres in New York or anywhere else. From civilian and 
humanitarian perspectives, the statistics are not about a competition, but guides to 
the scale of atrocity whose essence does not lie in counting or spectacles. It lies in 
the irreversible sense of loss when my/your/any child, parent, spouse, sibling, 
friend or neighbour suffers unnecessary and horrible death. Just one person’s 
feelings of loss and outrage tell us what this is really about. Numbers should not 
mask the faces and places of grief; only aid in bearing witness and opposing the 
wilful pursuit of such killing.  
Tokyo and the “Big Fire” Raid.  
Tokyo was out of reach, except for carrier-borne attacks, until the final year 
of the war. Annihilation came in a very short time compared to London and Berlin. 
Of some ninety recognised air raids, eight caused 99 percent of civilian casualties 
and area burnt out (Table 5). However, nothing equalled the night of 9th-10th March, 
1945, when the capital was attacked by 334 B-27 bombers or “Superfortresses.” 
They were the newest, most advanced and expensive air weapon, and each carried 
some 5.5 tons of bombs. Not the largest raid of the war, it was nevertheless a 
formidable force; its mission to destroy Tokyo (Craven and Cate, 1948-53, vol. 5; 
Caiden, 1960; Edoin, 1987; Hewitt, 1987). 
The “aiming point” was the most densely built-up and inhabited Asakusa 
District, where raid plans estimated an average of 40,000 persons per square 
kilometre, rising to 55,000 in parts. The ratio of “roofed over” to total area was 
exceptional: almost 75 percent for Asakusa and far in excess of most Western city 
cores. Here too were packed, flimsy structures, highly susceptible to fire; 99 
percent were wooden in Asakusa and not less than 96 percent in the surrounding 
areas (Sherry, 1987, 100-15).16 
                                                 
16 HO 191/194; AIR 52/143; AIR 52/77; AIR 52/143. For the logic of attacking residential areas 
with incendiaries see Janow (1943). 
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Table 5. Summary of raids and damages to Tokyo from 27 November, 1944, to 
August 7th, 1945, compared with March 9-10 “Big Fire” raid.  
 Damaging Raids 
All  >50 aircraft 
Casualties 
Dead Wounded 
Homeless 
 
Buildings  
Destroyed 
(Partly) 
ALL 
RAIDS 
89   28 95,992  70,957 2,861,857 755,717 (10,907) 
“Big 
Fire” 
     1 83, 793  40,918 1,008,005 267,183  (1,175) 
Source: USSBS P (1947b, 1947d); data were derived from official Japanese reports acquired after 
the surrender and widely considered to underestimate casualties in the “Big Fire” (see text) 
The bombers carried mainly incendiaries, about 2,000 tons in all, city-
wrecking and anti-personnel munitions chosen for effect in residential areas. The 
New York Times (21 March, 1945) described their action: 
... one of the principle instruments of destruction in the fire attacks ... 
the M-69 incendiary ... [is a] jellied gasoline bomb ... containing gel-
gas, a resin-type jelly [also called napalm] ... Cheesecloth impregnated 
with flaming jelly is spewed out in all directions over a radius of 
twenty-five yards shortly after the bomb strikes. The material burns 
fiercely at a heat of about 3,000 degrees F. for eight to ten minutes” 
(quoted in Reischauer, 1974, 130). 
The lead aircraft were over Tokyo around midnight and came in at low altitude. 
With poor defences and good visibility there was a high concentration of bombs. A 
rising wind helped generate a vast conflagration described thus by a fire-fighting 
expert: 
... an extended fire swept over 16 miles (25.7 km) in six hours. Pilots 
reported the air was so violent the B-29's turned over completely at 
6,000ft [1,820m] and the heat was so intense they had to put on oxygen 
masks ...” (Bond, 1946, 181).  
Things were considerably worse on the ground (Pacific War Research Society, 
1972, 13). Robert Guillian (1947) lived in Tokyo through the war and gave a 
detailed account. He describes desperate crowds converging on the great Senso-ji 
or Asakusa Kannon Temple, a Seventh Century Buddhist foundation credited with 
saving people who took refuge there in the 1923 earthquake and fire (Seidensticker, 
1983, 207). On this occasion, however, the temple was destroyed along with those 
seeking safety there.  
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First Aid posts were destroyed. Rescue units and 300+ fire engines on the 
scene early were unable to reach the stricken areas. Bombing continued for three 
hours, frustrating escape and rescue by filling the air with fire from canisters of 
jellied gasoline. Few raid shelters were adequate to withstand these fires. Many 
turned into death traps where thousands died of asphyxiation, carbon monoxide 
poisoning or heat stroke, common causes of death in large incendiary raids 
(USSBS E, 1945c; USSBS P, 1947) 
 By mid-morning on the 10th the main fire had burnt itself out, after laying 
waste to an area of 41 km2. Official Japanese estimates were 83-84,000 civilian 
dead (Edoin, 1987, 106). Later studies suggest a minimum of 100,000 (Selden, 
2007), some as many as 200,000 (Daniels, 1975, 129; Salmaggi and Palavisini, 
1979, 682)—at least 90 percent of all raid fatalities in the capital, perhaps a fifth for 
all raids on Japan. Over 280,000 buildings were destroyed, mostly residential. 
Estimates of the bombed-out were from 644,000 to over one million.17 An 
enormous evacuation followed.  
The calamity far exceeded anything Londoners faced, or Berliners in an 
individual raid. The nature of construction, so effective in feeding the fires, meant 
almost no vestige of burned neighbourhoods survived. The authorities saw no point 
in restoring services, leaving them as empty wastelands.   
A passage in the USAAF official history raises some compelling urbicidal issues: 
... One broadcast reported that the sea of flames which enclosed the 
residential and commercial sections of Tokyo was reminiscent of ... 
Tacitus’ famous account of the 64 A.D ... holocaust of Rome, caused 
by the Emperor Nero ... But the physical destruction and loss of life at 
Tokyo exceeded that [and] any of the other great conflagrations of the 
western world – London, 1666 (436 acres, 13,200 buildings); Moscow, 
1812 (38,000 buildings) Chicago, 1871 (2,124 acres, 17,450 buildings); 
San Francisco, 1906 (4 square miles, 21,188 buildings). Only Japan 
itself [in] 1923 at Tokyo and Yokohama, had suffered so terrible a 
disaster. No other air attack of the war, either in Japan or Europe, was 
so destructive of life and property (Craven and Cate, 1948-53. vol. 5, 
617). 
The 1923 fire was used as a model for planning the attack. Like other great fires in 
Tokyo’s past, it showed the vulnerability of low-lying and residential areas, and the 
importance of windy months in historical conflagrations, especially March and 
September. The objective was, indeed, to recreate a calamity.18 
                                                 
17 USBS P Files #12 and #56.  
18 HO 191/194, RED; REN, 424.  
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“Big Fire” was the worst attack, but others caused severe damage. A fire set 
by the night raid of 25th-26th May was even larger; the largest in the history of 
warfare. Less congested districts and the mass exodus after “Big Fire” meant fewer 
casualties, but 3,400 deaths in one night exceeded anything in London or Berlin. 
Another raid burnt out almost as much as “Big Fire”. A fourth, with 23.4 km2, was 
similar to the Hamburg firestorm, the worst in Germany, and another exceeded the 
Dresden firestorm (Hewitt, 1993).19  
An American serviceman, writing in September 1945, echoed his countryman in 
Berlin: 
... Tokyo, the first war casualty I've seen is a devastated, immodest 
mess, but the silence is what gets me most; no honks, yells, clangs - 
none of the stuff you hate about a town but come to expect. For Tokyo, 
for all Japan I suppose, the calamity is past, but everyone is still staring 
in that god-awful silence (Cary, 1975, 54). 
Bombing was not the only reason for the numbed state of so many Japanese. 
However, the bombed wastelands of the capital, described as “dead city” or “lunar 
landscapes” (USSBS, 1947a), were constant reminders of their ruined world.  
(In)decisive Blows? 
A fateful notion linking strategic air power to the plight of these capital cities 
was of the “knock-out blow” (Quester, 1966; MacIsaac, 1986).20 Then, as now, a 
pessimistic view of defence against air attack prevailed among the airmen, 
encouraging attacks as sudden and “total” as possible to avoid retaliation in kind.  
For a time, in 1940-41, the Luftwaffe claimed it would cripple Britain or keep her 
out of the war by delivering the heaviest possible blows on London. The great RAF 
attacks on Berlin and USAAF fire raids on Tokyo were justified in similar terms.  
Raid reports for air crew and the public emphasised vital communications, 
government buildings, state-institutions, key installations. In fact, the central, 
congested areas aimed at and destroyed contained few or no essential or more 
modern war industries. An impression was given of damage primarily to industries, 
yet items vital to the war were rarely hit or, like the railways, got going quickly; 
essential war workers were a small fraction of the casualties. In all three capitals 
the production “must” for weapons and war supplies was maintained almost to the 
last.21 
                                                 
19 USBS P file # 56. 
20  USBS E 193a; HO 192/1645; AIR14/763, 1779; AIR 20/4054, 4069. 
21 AIR 14/1229, 20/3234; AIR 20/4831 B, Ops. 1, 15th February. 
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There is, then, in the plans of strategic bombing, a sense of gross 
oversimplification of the relation between the capitals, especially their citizens’ 
“morale”, and a war effort. On economic warfare, Milward (1977, 298) finds the 
tendency was “... to believe what they wanted to believe ...” A lack of any clear 
impact on the course of the war by these capital city calamities challenges how 
urban realities were understood in bombing theory, and aggravates the sense of 
unnecessary suffering inflicted on non-combatants.  
The Big Blitz may have been less destructive than the worst-case predictions, 
but surely a serious test of the ‘knock-out blow’ thesis. No capital of a major 
power, no urban population, had endured such a weight and repetition of attack. If 
the air power theorists had been even partly right, Britain’s will or means to wage 
war should have suffered measurably. The opposite seems nearer the truth. The 
enormous civil destruction, unimaginable pain and personal loss for so many folk, 
and irrecoverable loss of cultural heritage never translated into great harm to the 
war effort. The real damage was not only largely confined to and borne by 
civilians, but they emerged more committed to the war than before (Calder, 1969).  
Despite vastly greater devastation, the Battle of Berlin also brought no 
serious change in the capital's war role. Neither bomb damage, labour shortage, nor 
demoralisation prevented munitions and other vital production from continuing to 
rise (Speer, 1970; Milward 1977, chapter 9)22. It did not “cost Germany the war” 
and yet, amazingly, the same belief soon resurfaced in a plan called Operation 
THUNDERCLAP. Although not carried out as such, its documents provide a clear 
statement of knock-out blow thinking, its urbicidal nature and the intent to cause 
civil disasters (Webster and Frankland, 1961, v.1V, 54).  
It was proposed that “... an all-out attack by every means at our disposal on 
German civilian morale might be decisive”23. A carpet of 2,000 tons of bombs per 
square mile was envisaged for central Berlin, or between 10,000 and 20,000 tons of 
bombs, “... something out of the ordinary ...”! This was to “... cause 90% 
devastation [such that]…3/4 of the people…in this area will become casualties. 
Assuming a daytime population of 300,000 [in the central 2 mi2], it may be 
expected that 220,000 casualties will be caused. 50% of these, or 110,000 may be 
expected to be killed ...” Moreover, being “... for purely moral effect”:  
... i) the attack must be delivered in such density that it imposes as 
nearly as possible 100% risk of death to the individual in the area... 
iii) The target chosen should be one involving the maximum 
associations, both traditional and personal, for the population as a 
                                                 
22 USBS E, 39 b 1-14; USBS.E #2, 2a, 3 and 3 
23 AIR 14/838, vol. 3, 52.  
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whole. Considerations of economic importance must not be permitted 
to influence the selection of the target. 
iv) subject to iii), the area selected should embrace the highest density 
of population ...”24 (emphases added). 
Equally relevant, the model for this annihilating blow on Berlin was developed by 
identifying what would do the same to London! THUNDERCLAP documents 
contain a raid plan to destroy London. (Since breaches of secrecy occur most often 
within the intelligence apparatus itself, it was perhaps fortunate the German Air 
Force no longer had the capacity to raid London!)  
The February 3rd, 1945, USAAF attack almost achieved the intensity 
THUNDERCLAP prescribed and something approaching the devastation. A mass 
exodus meant casualties were much less. Thereafter, Berlin was finally “written 
off” as an urban target. Yet, Germany’s leaders remained in the capital to direct the 
war to the very end. “Uniquely devastated” as it was, Allied troops had to take the 
city street by street in some of the bloodiest fighting of the war. 
“Big Fire” achieved or exceeded every ingredient expected of a knock-out 
blow. Strategic air power struck the “heart” of the enemy state long before an 
invasion was possible. Tokyo burned as Berlin would not and suffered unparalleled 
destruction. Civilian casualties, “de-housing” and panic-like uprooting exceeded 
the worst pre-war visions. Civilian survivors saw imminent death threatening 
everyone in the burning districts (Guillian, 1947; Pacific War Research Society, 
1972). 
General LeMay, commander of U.S.A.A.F units, regarded the raid as the 
most ‘successful’ of the war, causing more casualties than any other military action 
(Coffey, 1987). He did not mention that they were nearly all civilians; two-thirds 
women and children (Selden, 2008). Yet, there was no discernable break in the 
Japanese will to fight, or in civilian support. On March 10th, a great military parade 
took place in Tokyo, ignoring the thousands of families streaming out of the city 
(Havens, 1978, 178). The American airmen themselves did not pause to let the 
message sink in, but hurried to fire bomb nearly every other Japanese city (Hewitt, 
1997, 306) 
It should be emphasised that raid planning did not ignore, let alone spare, 
other cities. The assault on the capitals is a special threat and narrative of air power 
in relation to cities. However, residents of other heavily bombed cities faced the 
same or similar and sometimes more calamitous threats. There was even a kind of 
generalised knock-out-blow thinking. The Big Blitz turned into an attack on all 
                                                 
24 AIR 14/838, “10,000 Plan”, 
Proving Grounds of Urbicide 362 
major industrial cities (Wakefield, 1990). RAF Bomber Command pursued shifting 
notions of just how many German cities, and down to what minimum size, would 
have to be flattened to win the war (Webster and Frankland, 1961). The 
Superfortresses attacked almost all large and medium-sized Japanese cities. 
The Social Geography of Disaster 
If the bombing is commonly described as ‘indiscriminate’, raids were quite 
‘discriminatory’ in social and urban terms. Who lived and who died, whose homes 
were razed and whose survived, followed mainly from the social geography of 
density and wealth, much as in so-called natural disasters (Hewitt, 2007). However, 
raid planning was designed to exploit the most vulnerable areas. Over an area of 
many city blocks the fall of bombs was essentially random. The denser the 
buildings, the more likely free-falling, widely scattered bombs would hit them or, 
most important, start a fire whose flames would spread to other buildings. Fires 
caused most property damage and served as beacons guiding the further bombing.25 
London consisted of 96 boroughs. Some of the outer, suburban boroughs lost 
barely a dozen homes in total, their civilian casualties measured in single figures. 
By contrast, each of 26 inner boroughs had over 400 civilian air raid deaths 
(Hewitt, 1994b). Only three British cities, Liverpool, Birmingham and Glasgow, 
with populations three to four times larger, lost more residents than the inner 
boroughs of Lambeth (1,470 killed) and Wandsworth (1,253).26 Property damage, 
especially housing, was concentrated in historic core areas and dense East End 
boroughs along the river.27 Yet, more bombs actually fell over the extensive, outer 
boroughs, reflecting how the fraction of ground space covered in buildings was 
critical. Aldgate had 69 percent roofed-over area, Ealing or Finchley further out, 
had 12 percent; the whole of Greater London barely 5 percent. 
The V-weapon strikes were virtually random within broad, tens-of-kilometers 
wide pathways. Nevertheless, their net impact was concentrated in densely 
inhabited areas of southern and central London boroughs, including over 40 
percent of housing losses. In Fulham, Deptford, Camberwell, and Wandsworth 
deaths approached those of the Big Blitz (Collier, 1957).  
Equally telling are exact places of death. As early as October 1940, more 
people were dying in their homes than anywhere else. Air raid shelter deaths came 
second. Deaths at work or in the streets were negligible. In a mid-April, 1941, raid 
in S.E. London, 18 percent died in shelters and 70 percent in their homes, mainly in 
row-houses, the most frequently hit buildings.28 However, a marked increase in 
                                                 
25 HO 191/9, 198/244, 199/284, AIR 14/1779. 
26 PRO/HO 191/9.  
27 HO 193/13; HO 193/45; HO 198/244. 
28 HO 191, Bradford Hill’s notes R.E.N # 441 p.2.      
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tuberculosis between 1939 and 1941 was related to nights in damp, cold shelters; a 
greater risk, some thought, than the bombs. No wonder people preferred to stay at 
home, their numbers increasing through the Big Blitz.  
There were significant age and gender differences. The highest proportionate 
death toll in the Big Blitz and in many German cities was among the elderly, 
tending to increase with age. “Shelter deaths of the aged” were widely reported, 
involving heart attacks and other stress- or privation-related causes—a kind of 
involuntary euthanasia (USSBS, E, 1945c). The highest numbers of casualties in 
homes and shelters were women, along with relatively more child deaths. In the 
denser County of London districts, more females were killed than males (CWRC, 
1954).  
Where names, addresses and dates are available they reveal multiple deaths 
in single households (CWRC, 1954), mainly at home but also in air raid shelters 
and, above all, in the “disaster” raids hitting row houses or tenement blocks, or 
large air raid shelters (Marwick, 1976).29 Multiple deaths in particular families took 
more children, females and elderly (Hewitt, 1994b). Since mobilisation for war was 
at an early stage in the Big Blitz, more men were present. The V-weapon attacks, 
later in the war, caused proportionately higher female and child deaths. When the 
bombing was greatest over Berlin and Tokyo, mobilisation was far more complete 
and casualty figures reflect the greater presence of “non-essential personnel”. 
Meanwhile, researchers at Britain’s Ministry of Home Security had decided that 
losing a home was even more distressing for British civilians than deaths. I doubt 
this, but it led RAF planning to give priority to de-housing German people, 
intensifying impacts on resident civilians. 
 Berlin was divided into twenty Districts (Bezirken). Damage was 
concentrated in the more densely packed residential areas. In the central built-up 
areas, 31 percent of housing was destroyed, compared to 4 percent in the outer 
suburbs (Foreign Office and MEW, 1944, 8). Civilian casualties were heaviest in 
Kreuzberg (1,697 killed), Charlottenburg (1,621) and Mitte (1,463). After the 
Battle of Berlin, visible damage was greatest in the inner city. Casualties and 
property loss were concentrated here, mainly among older, more congested 
buildings.30  
The geography of demolition also highlights the role of “disaster” attacks. 
Half of Steglitz’ casualties occurred on 23/24 August, 1943: 57 percent of the 
bombed out, and two-thirds of building damage; Steglitz’ “catastrophe.” Then 
again, some residents were killed in thirty-two other attacks (Hampe and Mauter, 
                                                 
29 HO 191/60; USBS E, 1 File 152 
30 HO 193/13, 45; USSBS #E 39 
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1982).31 It is a reminder that, for most of the war, raiding was so arduous, and 
navigation errors and disruption by the defences so severe, that there were huge 
uncertainties in when and whether even high density areas would suffer. 
Tokyo comprised fifteen “Old” and twenty “New” Wards, the low-lying and 
most densely inhabited ones suffering over 90 percent of civilian deaths (Sherry, 
1987; Edoin, 1987). Districts completely razed in the 9th-10th March conflagration 
formed 7 percent of the city’s area but housed over a quarter of its population. 
Almost total annihilation of the inner wards explains their phenomenal population 
loss. The most populous, Honjo, with 241,000 residents in 1944, fell by 95 percent; 
Fukugawa and Asakusa by 93 and 89.5 percent respectively. Old City wards fell to 
a quarter of their 1944 population, or a fifth of 1940. Some outer, New Wards lost 
half their pre-raid population, if proportionately fewer killed. Arakawa, the most 
populous ward, lost over 250,000 folk, the largest in total numbers and 75 percent 
of its pre-raid residents (USSBS P, 1947b). 
“Low City” Disasters 
In the capitals, as other large cities, people spoke of the attacks as “slum 
raids.” Official reports identified the greatest losses in London with “crowded 
terraces and courts”, “mean, narrow streets”, “back-to-back’ and “congested 
Nineteenth century housing”; “... house property of slum, or semi-slum [sic!] 
character and shoddily built”.32 
In Berlin, apartments suffered twice the losses of other dwellings, mainly in 
working-class areas. A Japanese journalist recalled how “(o)ne night ... 100,000 
people were killed when they hit a slum area [presumably “Big Fire” raid] ...”, and 
added, “If the raid had come in a ‘better’ section of town, the victims would have 
been able to spread more concern ...”.33 
Writing about old Tokyo, Edward Seidensticker (1983, viii) distinguishes 
between, “... what occurred in the city because it was a capital, and what occurred 
because it was a city ...” He explores how capital and city are intertwined, but 
unequally. The greatest bombing losses occurred in the Shitamachi, which he calls 
Tokyo’s Low City or plebaeian flatlands—socially, as well topographically, “low”. 
Here the great fire raids sought to hurt “the capital,” to bring about a strategic 
“decapitation” of the state, on the dubious assumption that ordinary city-folk and 
their living space had leverage against the “high city.” Instead, the latter’s very 
survival had come to require and accept sacrificing the former!  
                                                 
31 Stadtarchiv, Berlin # 2610 Hl 1a. Oberbürgermeister Rept (24th 30th etc, Aug. 1943) 
32 PRO/HO 191/60 
33 USBS P 2d Doc (I)-(II) Interrogation No.419, p.4, 25/10 
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In each capital, wartime conditions also exaggerated losses among those 
subject to social disadvantage in peacetime (Hewitt, 1994a). There were many 
more women alone and woman-headed households. Battlefront casualties were 
disproportionate among men from densely populated inner city areas, leaving many 
more widowed or, de facto, “single-parent” households. Relatively, there were 
more elderly folk, unemployed youths, children and disabled needing care. 
Anecdotal evidence suggests care givers, in most cases women, were put at greater 
risk. Popular accounts have emphasised women engaged in war work, the “Rosie 
the Rivetters” or “land army girls” (Gluck, 1987), but far more women and female 
bombing victims were “homemakers”.  
Equally important from a civil perspective, many older and more vulnerable 
neighbourhoods had resembled collections of ‘urban villages’, each with its special 
flavour and history, and a long-time resident population (Stern, 1947; Havens, 
1978; Hostettler, 1990). Their inhabitants surely wanted a better life, better 
conditions, but still valued the places where their lives were actually set. Such 
matters were irrelevant to raid planning, but not to residents at the sharp end of 
urbicidal warfare. Those who survived would mourn those lost places (Hewitt, 
1983, 276-77; Nipper and Nutz, 1993). 
Interpretations: Urbicidal Dreams and Realities 
Over time, much like the war itself, these metropolitan calamities moved and 
expanded successively from England to Germany and then Japan. Impacts in each 
capital differed because the types of munitions used and the scale of attack 
changed. In London and Berlin most injuries and deaths were due to high explosive 
bombs and fragmentation devices, although fire caused most property damage 
(Zuckerman, 1978). In Tokyo, like most other Japanese and German cities, 
incendiaries killed more people and fire-related losses exceeded all others (Hewitt, 
1997, chapter11). Londoners and Berliners endured almost six years of raid-related 
stresses and privations, including life in bomb-damaged homes and neighourhoods. 
Conversely, Tokyo was annihilated in short order, but spared the years of raid 
threats and rubble, though not other and severe wartime privations (Havens, 1978). 
In many respects, however, there were fundamental similarities between the 
impacts of bombing on civilians in each city. 
The ingredients of Urbicide 
First and foremost, the raids destroyed the life support of urban communities. 
For each city they defined a negative urban, civil ecology distinguished by:  
1) fatalities concentrated among resident civilians; 
2) a predominance of casualties among “definitive civilians”: women, 
children, the elderly and infirm, and persons who were not just non-
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combatants but mainly involved in continuance of, and dependence on, 
civil life; 
3) attacks on the domestic foundations of the city, through physical 
damage predominantly to homes, the ‘de-housing’ of residents, and 
death and injuries mainly occurring in homes and civilian air raid 
shelters;  
4) enforced displacement of resident populations, directly for the 
bombed-out, indirectly through official evacuations that separated and 
dispersed families and neighbours, dismembering their shared worlds; 
5) physical destruction to civil support systems and urban institutions; 
shops, schools, hospitals, places of entertainment and worship; these 
institutions were subjected to the second-greatest level of destruction, 
after housing; 
6) extensive, indiscriminate but often intentional destruction of 
buildings of historic and artistic significance, ancient landmarks, 
symbols of identity and continuity of urban settlements;  
7) indiscriminate, wall-to-wall destruction of the inner city, the 
capitals’ historic site and urban heritage; exploiting the vulnerability of 
its social and civic geography, hoping to influence war functions or 
political power; 
8) generating landscapes of violence whose rubble and dead buried 
under it converted the living city into a necropolis. 
For a geographer, such a profile of harm amounts to “place annihilation”, the 
extermination of lived geographies (Hewitt, 1983). It underscores the murder and 
displacement of the place-makers and, in wartime, place-maintainers of cities, as 
well as the razing of built environments and urban heritage. Added to this, so-
called civil defence failed when needed the most. The often heroic efforts of 
firemen, first-aid units and others could not reverse the failure to invest adequately 
in civil defence, or remotely as much as in the bomber fleets.  
Similar concerns underpin the notion of urbicide, but identify something 
beyond destructive outcomes: intentional gross violation of human rights or crimes 
of war. The once-secret raid plans like THUNDERCLAP show the profile of 
“place annihilation” outlined above was an intended, not accidental, achievement. 
It gives the lie to the propaganda of reprisals and ‘collateral damage’. The counter-
city raids described here were intended to terrorise civilians, the losses largely paid 
by them during and after the war. If anything is urbicide, the attacks on the capitals 
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were. However, so were attacks on hundreds of other cities in the Second World 
War.  
Discussions of urbicide tend to focus on profound changes in the nature of 
wars and warfare since 1945, and also in urbanism and urban living (Graham, 
2004). From certain perspectives it is hard to disagree, but not so clearly from that 
of bombed civilians. Air raid casualties have continued to be overwhelmingly 
civilian, from the Korean War to Afghanistan, Iraq, Lebanon, Gaza and Georgia 
today. Air power has remained essentially a state instrument for dominant powers 
who lead in the manufacture, sale and use of air weapons, mainly the world war 
victors or their clients. In particular, two key features argue continuity more than 
change: the condition of civilians in bombed cities, and the mind-set and intentions 
of counter-city bombing.  
Concluding remarks 
On the one hand, even if it was sixty years ago, the study and remembrance 
of what happened in bombed capitals seems to me justified in its own right, as 
other great calamities; not least to do justice to the collective memories of erstwhile 
“enemies” (Irwin-Zarecka, 1994). The neglect of comparative study, surely a major 
concern of geographers and historians; the implications of such widely championed 
and praised brutality; the suffering of so many innocent and defenceless persons on 
all sides; all seem compelling reasons to look back. On the other hand, as the title 
suggests, key elements of those campaigns appear as ‘proving grounds’ for what 
bombing did to other cities in the world war and would continue to do to the 
present time, including capitals like Baghdad, Kabul, Grozny, and Beirut.  
What the bombing revealed at once in London, later in Berlin and Tokyo, 
was a remarkable disarticulation between the capital as such, or its war functions, 
and the plight of its citizens. Matters crucial to the war effort were a good deal 
more defensible or moveable than densely built-up areas and civil populations. The 
capitals’ authority was, seemingly, more abstract than concrete; more like the 
thermostat than the power-house of war. The results strongly support the view that 
these attacks “... hit what was physically the most vulnerable but socially the least 
effective component of the city ...” (Sherry, 1987, 286). Scattered through Allied 
raid planning documents are references to the voiceless condition of the German 
and Japanese people. Some urged bombing Government headquarters or Party 
apparatus, if the focus could not be on factories, power plants, and transportation. 
The balance of air force and technical opinion favoured indiscriminate annihilation 
of densely-packed inner districts.34 Yet, even had they substantially influenced the 
course of the world war, reduced its length and overall casualties, could the attacks 
on capital cities and all the other urban area raids be justified? What does it mean to 
                                                 
34 AIR 20/1129; 3234; 4831 
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not merely condone but aim to kill defenceless civilians to save soldiers’ lives or 
influence enemy soldiers and leaders? To destroy the major, essentially 
defenceless, centres of civilised life to reduce the toll of air, sea and ground battles? 
In the world war a basic difference emerged, material as well as moral, 
between the urban attacks as a civilian threat and supposed air power goals. Yet, if 
the capitals seemed to offer unique opportunities for air power, limited strategic 
results never led to a reduction, let alone rejection, of this style of raiding. This also 
applies to counter-city raiding from Korea to Afghanistan; dubious results, but a 
refusal to stop experimenting. 
More alarming, perhaps, is the absence of any effective or concerted effort to 
defend and promote civil priorities against this fundamental threat to civil life. 
Rather, bombing has escalated, even to serve, supposedly, progressive values: 
“humanitarian wars” or to “bring democracy”! Meanwhile, the nature and 
prevalence of civilian losses are identical to the world war bombings (Hewitt, 
1997; Ali, 2000). 
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